The Komnenos Restoration
The Komnenos Restoration
Research Question: To what extent was the Komnenos dynasty (1081- 1185 CE) successful in restoring the Roman Empire following its decline in the eleventh century?
Word Count: 3987
Contents
Introduction:
Body:
Treaty with Venice:
Reforms of Alexios I:
The policy of vassalization:
Failure to reconquer Anatolia:
Impact of the crusades:
Diplomacy with the Crusader States:
Failure to secure substantial gains under Manuel I:
Conclusion:
Introduction:
This
essay will analyse the impact of the factors which played a part in shaping the
course of imperial history under the rule of the Komnenos dynasty as well as
the actions taken by them and determine the manner in which they influenced its
resurgence in order to gauge the success of what is remembered as the ‘Komnenos
Restoration’. The factors that have been identified and will be examined are:
the alliance with Venice, reforms under Alexios I, policy of vassalization,
failure to reconquer Anatolia, the impact of the crusades, diplomatic relations
with the crusader states, and failure to secure substantial gains under Manuel
I.
It is
necessary to acknowledge that the Roman Empire during this era is popularly
known as the Byzantine Empire, however since the former is the more accurate
terminology, it is the one this essay will use (Romanland: Ethnicity and
Empire in Byzantium). It is also worth noting that only the three main
Komnenos emperors will be considered, those being Alexios I (1081 – 1118 CE),
John II (1118 – 1143 CE), and Manuel I (1143 – 1180 CE), as the reigns of the
remaining two emperors produced by the dynasty (Alexios II and Andronikos I)
were too short (five years) to have any substantial impact on the state of the
empire.
This
essay utilizes various primary and secondary sources to facilitate its
investigation. The most notable of these are: The Alexiad by Anna Komnenos, and
Empire of Manuel Komnenos by Paul Magdalino. To provide a brief examination of
these vital sources;
The
Alexiad is the most substantial source on the reign of Alexios I, it is a
primary source written by his daughter Anna Komnenos. While the detailed
information it provides is invaluable to any historian studying the Komnenos
Restoration, her being the daughter of the Emperor and a Roman which includes
their characteristic supercilious attitude results in her work having a
persistent and obvious bias present throughout the text.
‘The
Empire of Manuel Komnenos’ by Paul Magdalino is another major source for the
essay. In prior centuries, Manuel I was often blamed for the decline that
followed his death and held in low regard as a result. This book is a
re-examination of his reign with the goal of creating a more balanced analysis.
However, this carries the risk of it stressing on events which portray him in a
more positive light. Despite it, the source’s detailed account of his rule and
analysis of his foreign policy has proven to be useful for this topic.
The
reign of Emperor Basil II Macedonian (976 – 1025 CE) marked the height of the
Roman Empire in the second millennium. While it was no longer a continent
dominating super-state, it had regained its status as the dominant power in
Europe and the Middle East. It was the most powerful the Empire had been since
the death of Emperor Maurice (582 - 602 CE) His long rule saw the
centralization of the government, expansion of the standing army, curtailing
the power of the Anatolian military aristocracy, and the reintegration of the
Balkans and the first Bulgarian Empire (The Rule of Basil II: The Warrior
Emperor) This
is the standard that the Komnenos emperors will be compared against, as a
comparison with the state at the absolute apex of its power under Emperor
Trajan I (98 – 117 CE) would be unrealistic and unfair as the Empire of old
spanned from Mesopotamia to Britain and it has been a thousand years since
during which the state has lost most of its territories.
Following
the death of Basil II in 1025 CE, the Empire was ruled by a series of weak
rulers whose poor governance sent the empire into a decline. Most importantly,
it was weakened militarily by the disbandment of armies 50,000 strong in
Armenia (Byzantium: The Apogee) Politically, the weakness of the emperor
allowed the aristocracy to increase their own power, creating a conflict
between the imperial court in Constantinople and the Anatolian military
aristocracy, decentralizing the state and weakening it during a period it could
not afford to be weakened given the threat posed by the Seljuks. All of this
culminated at the Battle of Manzikert (1071 CE) when the Emperor Romanos IV was
captured resulting in a series of civil wars during which the Turks managed to
conquer most of Anatolia, a region that had been the heartland of the Empire
since the seventh century (Battle of Manzikert).
Body:
Treaty with Venice:
In
1081, Emperor Alexios Komnenos signed a treaty with the Republic of Venice
which granted it extensive trading privileges in exchange for naval aid. This
was a decision made in face of a Norman invasion of the Balkans which, given
that Anatolia had already fallen to the Turks, posed an existential threat to
the empire (Alexiad). However, in the long term this resulted in a
decline of the imperial fleets, rendering the Romans completely dependent on Venice
which allowed the latter to continuously press for greater privileges,
weakening the empire’s economy.
Both
John II and Manuel I attempted to oppose this policy. The former failed due to
the aforementioned weakness of the imperial fleets. The empire had grown so
dependent on external naval aid that it lacked the capability to protect its
coasts from raiding fleets sent by Venice, forcing him to capitulate and
reinstate the treaty (John the Good). The latter successfully
emancipated the Empire from dependence on Venice and managed to inflict a
crushing defeat on them in 1171 CE, but this ultimately amounted to nothing as
merely two years after his death in 1180 CE, the treaty had been restored (Exonerating
Manuel Komnenos).
This
dependence on the unreliable Venetians and decline of the imperial fleets
eventually culminated in the fourth crusade during which the Empire was unable
to protect the sea walls of its capital resulting in the fall of
Constantinople. It is unlikely that the crusaders could have successfully
assaulted the Theodosian walls, for almost a thousand years Constantinople’s
defences had never fallen, they had repulsed armies far larger than those
brought by the fourth crusade (The Arab Siege of Constantinople, 717-18).
However, the sea walls of the city were never as heavily fortified as the land
walls, it was through here that the crusaders attacked and overwhelmed the
Romans (Sack of Constantinople 1204 - Fourth Crusade Documentary). Had
the Empire’s fleets been in a position to resist the Venetians, it is probable
that in such a scenario the fourth crusade would have been a failure, and
Constantinople would have held firm. The Empire wouldn’t have splintered into
multiple successor states, it would not have lost its richest and most
important province, its capital would not have been sacked, its treasures would
not have been looted. The fourth crusade was the fatal blow the Empire could
not recover from, had it not happened it is likely it would have survived for
much longer, if it ever fell at all. Therefore, the failure of the Komnenos to
rebuild the imperial fleets, relying instead on the Venetians is one of the
critical causes in the allowing the fourth crusade to be successful, and
therefore a long-term cause for the fall of the Roman Empire.
Reforms of Alexios I:
The
thematic system instituted by Contans II (641 – 668 CE) was replaced by the
Pronoia system. It was a temporary grant of fiscal rights to an individual in
exchange for military service. Such a system allowed Alexios to raise armies
without having to directly pay them in an attempt to circumvent the difficulty
of having an empty treasury. This reform proved to be a necessity due to a
multitude of factors, the most important of which will now be examined.
Firstly,
the Tagmata, the professional army was almost completely destroyed at the
Battle of Manzikert (The Komnenian Response to Seljuq Victories: The
Development of the Byzantine Army), it suffered further casualties at
Dyrrachium (Battle of Dyrrachium 1081) leaving the Empire without its
primary offensive forces.
The
situation was exacerbated by the neglect of the Thematic armies under the
Macedonians in a bid to centralize the military and curtail the power of the
Strategos (The Komnenian Response to Seljuq Victories: The Development of
the Byzantine Army), the military aristocracy. This neglect was continued
throughout the remainder of the eleventh century till the Battle of Manzikert
and the destruction of the Tagmata. Without the defence in depth provided by
the thematic armies, the Seljuks were able to conquer most of Asia Minor. This
neglect also meant that Alexios could not rely on the Balkans themes for
reinforcements, and reform was necessary.
Lastly,
the empire could no longer rely on its economy, half a century of misrule in
combination with the fact that the Empire also lost half its territory and its
tax revenue with it, and the debasement of the currency meant that the state
was on the verge of bankruptcy (Alexiad). It could not afford at that
moment to maintain a large standing army. The above factors justify the
implementation of the pronoia system, which allowed the empire to raise new
armies during a time of crisis, therefore it can be concluded that this was a
net positive for the Empire, and to some extent contributed to the restoration
of the imperial armies.
The
second of his main reforms was the replacement of the gold Solidus, which had
been thoroughly debased by then, with the hyperpyron in a bid to control
inflation and fix the economy (Alexios Komnenos: Crisis and Crusade).
Based on the exorbitant spending of his successors, especially Manuel I, it can
be said that this reform was immensely successful in restoring the Empire’s
economy to a similar standard as it was during the golden age under the
Macedonians.
The policy of vassalization:
Over
the course of their rule the Komnenos dynasty consistently demonstrated a
preference for maintaining and creating vassal states in place of direct
conquest. This is despite the fact that these vassals had repeatedly proven
that given the chance they would act against Constantinople’s interest, and
rebel whenever they saw the opportunity to do so. This is particularly common
during a succession, while competent emperor would generally be able to
suppress these revolts, a weak one could see the Empire’s influence unravel
within an extremely short period of time, which is precisely what ended up
happening following the death of Manuel I in 1180 CE, a series of weak emperors
failed to maintain the network of client states and vassals causing the Empire
to enter a death spiral eventually culminating in its collapse in the fourth
crusade of 1204 CE (Fourth Crusade).
The most prominent examples of the fact that maintaining this policy was not in
the interests of the Empire are Serbia, and Antioch. The latter will be
addressed later in the essay in a section dedicated to the crusaders. The
former rebelled multiple times (in 1127, 1149, and 1165 CE) against the
Komnenos Emperors, yet despite having the opportunity to reintegrate the
territory, they instead elected to keep it despite its obvious disloyalty. This
decision becomes especially egregious when taken into consideration the fact
that it often rebelled with aid from multiple foreign powers (usually Germany,
Hungary, and Iconium), pulling the empire into conflict with the Kingdom of
Hungary on multiple occasions. This insistence on refusing to annex it becomes
particularly baffling under Manuel I, who after multiple wars against Hungary
and Serbia annexed the Hungarian territories in the Balkans and turned it into
a client state yet allowed Serbia to keep its autonomy (Exonerating Manuel
Komnenos). Given that he had plans to annex the rest of the Balkans anyway,
there was no benefit for the Empire in keeping Serbia. Following his death,
imperial control over the Balkans evaporated, including over Serbia which
rebelled and the weak emperors who now sat on the throne were unable to stop
them. Had it been reintegrated as an imperial province such an outcome may have
been avoided.
It is necessary
to acknowledge that the above viewpoint is not expressed by any historical
sources, and is an argument constructed on the basis of the research conducted
for this essay and the information presented.
However,
it is also possible that the Empire was still not in a sufficiently strong
position to be able to attempt a full reconquest of lost territories. It had
not yet managed to rebuild its armies to the size before the decline of the
11th century, this is evident when comparing the size of the army under Basil
II in 1025 which is estimated to be approximately 100,000 strong (Byzantium
and its Army) while being only around 50,000 strong at the peak of the
Komnenos Dynasty’s power under Manuel I in 1176 (Warfare, State, and Society
in the Byzantine World). Committing its forces to a single frontier could
result in another being left vulnerable allowing an enemy to exploit that
opportunity, which was likely, given the myriad of enemies the Empire had at
any point, opening the risk of losing further lands. Yet, given the many disadvantages
the system of creating a network of client states poses over direct
administration, as elucidated in the previous paragraphs, this essay deems this
policy a failure on part of the dynasty.
Failure to reconquer Anatolia:
The
regions of Anatolia were the heartlands of the Empire between the eight and
eleventh centuries. They constituted its primary recruiting grounds and
provided extensive defence in depth thanks to the thematic system, it was also
the greatest part of its arable lands. Its loss in during the Seljuk invasion
was catastrophic for the empire, therefore it should have been the emperors
highest priority to restore it to imperial rule. It is the greatest failing of
the Komnenos dynasty to have not being able or willing to do so.
This
is a mistake made by each of the emperors, all three of them were often faced
with a weakened Sultanate of Iconium on multiple occasions. This section will
highlight a few of those instances to support this argument.
Aftermath
of the first crusade: The power of the Seljuk Turks was severely weakened by
the crusader onslaught, there was a real chance to end the crisis once and for
all by capturing Iconium and dismantle the Sultanate of Rum. However, for some
unknown reason Alexios instead saw it fit to merely accept their vassalization.
This proved to be of no benefit whatsoever to the empire and it did not prevent
the outbreak of multiple future wars between the Romans and Seljuks under his
successors.
Infighting
amidst the Turks: With the death of Sultan Masud I of Iconion in 1156, the
Sultanate of Rum fell into infighting and weakened significantly. Manuel had
the chance to completely destroy Rum and restore Anatolia to the empire but
elected to instead try a diplomatic approach. This eventually led to a battle
in 1161 during which he defeated the Seljuk army, but instead of reintegrating
Anatolia into the empire he accepted the Sultan Arslan’s offer of
vassalization. Which would prove to be a grievous error fifteen years later
with a Seljuk victory at the battle of Myriokephalon. This assertion is
supported by historian Niketas Choniates, writing in the aftermath of the
fourth crusade, who condemns the alliance between Constantinople and Iconium (Exonerating
Manuel I Komnenos).
Battle
of Myriokephalon: Following a worsening of relations between the Seljuk Sultan
and the Emperor in 1176, Manuel at long last finally decided to conquer Iconium
and end the Sultanate of Rum. But despite the advice of his top generals, he
recklessly blundered into a valley and got ambushed at the battle of
Myriokephalon. Despite the notoriety this battle has gained over the years,
mostly due to the works of Niketas Choniates and William of Tyre, the actual
losses were not particularly grievous. The romans lost their siege engines and
auxiliary troops, but the empire’s war machine remained intact. It would have
been entirely possible to launch another assault, and Sultan Arslan could only
withstand a Roman assault for so long given the discrepancy in the resources
available to their states. However, he opted against it, maintaining a mostly
defensive posture in Anatolia. The battle of Myriokephalon was the last time
the Roman Empire went on the offensive against the Turks.
A
possible explanation for them not investing substantial resources in finishing
the reconquest of Asia-Minor is the fact that inner Anatolia simply was not as
economically lucrative as the regions in the Levant, Italy and Egypt seeing as
it consisted primarily of mountainous areas unsuitable for agriculture which
encouraged the Komnenos to focus their attention elsewhere as that may have
appeared to have been in the Empire’s best interest and any modern assessments
regarding their decision on this matter is a result of the benefit of
hindsight. It is also worth mentioning that defeating and hunting down the
semi-nomadic Turks would have required a substantial investment of resources,
one which the Komnenos may not have considered to be worth the possible gains.
However,
as previously mentioned it used to be the primary source of manpower for the
Empire, its rough terrain was ideal for defending the borders, and there is
also the fact that restoring central Anatolia would permanently eliminate a
powerful long-term rival, one whose descendants would eventually bring about
the fall of the Roman Empire (Fall of Constantinople).
Impact of the crusades:
Perhaps
the most important of the Alexios I’s actions however, was his plea to Pope
Urban II for aid against the Seljuk Turks. What Alexios was probably expecting
was a small mercenary force of European knights to assist in his wars, what the
Pope ended up doing surpassed everyone’s expectations. He called for a crusade
to reclaim Jerusalem directing all of catholic Europe to mobilise to this end,
thus beginning the first crusade (The Alexiad).
The
first crusade weakened the Turks and allowed Alexios to reconquer much of
western coastal Anatolia, thereby abating the threat of enemies being at the
gates of Constantinople on the opposite side of the Bosporus (Alexiad).
Given the state that the empire was in, it is possible that such a reclamation
of imperial territories would have failed without the support of the crusaders
due to the poor state of the army and economy, as has been analysed previously,
which had not yet finished recovering. The second crusade also brought a
largely positive outcome for the empire. Its failure demonstrated
to the crusader states in the levant that only Constantinople was capable of
protecting them from Muslim aggression and solidified imperial influence over
the levant for the remainder of his reign (Exonerating Manuel Komnenos),
though it did not ultimately bring substantial benefit to the Empire,
theoretically stretching the reach of the Roman Empire throughout the Levantine
coast for the first time since the reign of Emperor Heraclius (610 – 641 CE).
However,
the long-term consequences of the crusades would prove to be nothing short of
catastrophic for the Roman Empire. It resulted in the creation of several
crusader states in the Levant who seemed to relish in exploiting every
opportunity to act against Constantinople’s interests. This is evident in the
multiple wars between the Empire and Antioch, refusal to accept imperial
suzerainty, and unwillingness to aid the Romans in any meaningful capacity when
they did (Alexiad) (John the Good) (Exonerating Manuel
Komnenos). Furthermore, as stated before, the Fourth Crusade was one of the
most important factors which led to the fall of the Roman Empire, and the seeds
for it are sown in this period.
Diplomacy with the Crusader States:
Throughout
the rule of the Komnenos dynasty, the Empire maintained a consistent policy in
the levant and with the crusader states, that being to vassalize them and keep
them in the imperial sphere of influence. This essay has argued that their
strategy of creating a network of client states was largely a failure due to
the fact that following Manuel’s death this network disintegrated. The same
applies in this instance, with the argument being that it would have been
preferable to either conquer or ignore the crusaders instead of wasting
precious resources in attempting to subjugate them, especially when those
resources should have instead been spent on restoring Anatolia, the Empire’s
old heartlands. This assertion will be justified with evidence:
John
II makes an attempt at co-operation with the crusader states in the levant by
attempting to enforce imperial suzerainty over them. While he did manage to
force Antioch, Edessa, and Tripoli to acknowledge Constantinople as their
liege, this ultimately proved to be a wasted effort. This is exemplified at the
siege of Shaizar, where John and his forces were attempting to capture the
city, while Prince Raymond of Antioch and Count Joscelin II of Edessa played dice
and feasted, refusing to aid in the siege (John the Good).
During
the first crusade, the crusaders all swore an oath to Alexios I to return all
imperial lands back to the Empire. They failed to keep this promise. With
regards to Antioch, a city only recently lost by the Empire, Alexios chose to
try diplomacy and signed the treaty of Devol, according to which after the
death of Bohemond of Antioch, the city would be returned to Roman hands.
Tancred, Bohemond’s successor refused to honour the treaty (Exonerating
Manuel Komnenos). These instances prove that the crusaders could not be
trusted and attempts at co-operation with them were futile.
Failure to secure substantial gains under Manuel I:
Emperor
Manuel I embarked on multiple ambitious campaigns over the course of his
reign none of these succeeded in
accomplishing anything of substance for the Empire. This is clearly evident in
his wars in Egypt and Italy.
His
campaign in Italy has been criticized by many historians like Niketas Choniates
and with good reason. It cost the empire precious resources that could have
been used elsewhere, namely Anatolia, and ultimately failed to secure any
significant gains. And despite making significant investments into it, he did
not commit any further forces to the frontier after an army was defeated at the
battle of Brindisi, despite the fact that the Normans were in a precarious
situation. He then changed his policy and allied with the Normans against the
significantly more powerful German Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. This allowed
him to secure the vassalage of Genoa, and Pisa but as discussed before, vassals
failed to be of much use to the Empire. He funded the Italian league of Verona
against the Germans, which failed to produce any results that could benefit the
Empire. He was eventually outplayed in Italy by an alliance of the Pope and
German Emperor, ending this expensive campaign with nothing to show for it (Exonerating
Manuel Komnenos).
Manuel
launched an ambitious plan to reconquer Egypt in 1169, if successful he would
have returned a province lost to the empire for half a millennium. However,
this plan relied on the cooperation of the unreliable crusaders, namely the
Kingdom of Jerusalem. Almaric, the King of Jerusalem proved to be unwilling to
cooperate, and the offensive soon had to be abandoned with nothing to show for
it. To worsen the situation, the fleeting transporting the army was caught in a
storm on the way back, resulting in the army suffering needless casualties (Exonerating
Manuel Komnenos).
Had
the Emperor chosen to spend his resources more carefully and focus on
consolidating the Empire’s position instead of launching ambitious campaigns to
which he did not fully commit his forces, the Empire would have been left in a
better position. Most importantly, he chose to embark on these ventures while
Anatolia, the Empire’s former heartland, remained in Turkish hands. The Seljuks
were nominal imperial vassals, but as extensively proven, this was largely
meaningless.
Conclusion:
Therefore,
as analysed in the essay, the ‘Komnenos Restoration’ did manage to bring about
a period of resurgence, during which the Empire was able to somewhat recover
from the decline it had fallen into following the death of Emperor Basil II.
However, much of their gains disappeared with them. While under Manuel I, the
empire’s influence could be felt from Egypt to Germany, mere years after his
death these gains were lost, with the Empire almost being destroyed in the
fourth crusade 24 years later, which would likely have never been successful if
not for the long-term factors discussed here. If the progress made by the
‘Komnenos Restoration’ was so volatile that it could be unravelled in such a
short period of time, then it was not built on a solid foundation and cannot be
considered to have restored the Empire to a state comparable to the period
under and before the Macedonians. However, it is important to acknowledge that
if not for the Komnenos, it is highly probable that the crisis of the eleventh century
would have been the end of the Roman Empire.
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